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Protection for the Authors of Video Games
The quest for novel leisure time activity, augmented by new
technologies, has created a computer video game mania1 in the
United States. Understandably, piracy claims have accompanied
the marketplace popularity of such games. Confronted with a
flurry of copyright infringement claims over the last several
years, courts have uniformly indicated that the audiovisual dis-
play of a video game merits federal copyright protection.2 That
protection, however, is far from complete. If the rival display
varies in even a minor detail, courts may find no copyright
infringement. Under the aegis of a "substantial similarity" test,'
1. The typical video game challenges, and presumably entertains, by allowing the
game player control over a fanciful game piece displayed on a cathode ray tube (CRT)
and generated by the computer elements of the game. The player must use his game
piece to either destroy or avoid advancing enemy game pieces generated and controlled
by the computer elements of the game. A high level of sound, modulated in response to
the play of the game, often accompanies the game. One such game, "Asteroids," as of
1981 had gross sales of $125,000,000. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
222, 224 (D. Md. 1981). But cf. Landro & Feeney, Fierce Competition in Video Games
Behind Dive in Warner Stock Price, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1982, at 25, col. 4 (dive in
Warner stock price resulted, in large part, from Warner's lessened market share due to
numerous competitors rushing into the video game market).
2. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983); Wil-
hams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d. Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc., 546
F. Supp. 125, 155 (D.N.J. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Ken Williams, No. 81-410 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
28, 1981) (available prior to publication of this article on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981); Atari,
Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., No. 81 C 6099 (N.D. II. Nov. 3, 1981) (available prior to publica-
tion of this article on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Bay Coin
Distribs., Inc., No. 82-1153 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1981) (available prior to publication of
this article on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
3. Before a finding of infringement can be made, the courts must find a copying and
a demonstrable "substantial similarity" between the two works. See, e.g., Athletic Sales,
Inc. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (1983);
N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:14 (1981). Because direct proof of copying is difficult,
circumstantial evidence is usually sufficient. One circumstantial method of demonstrat-
ing copying is to show access by the defendant to the plaintiff's work. Access means
simply that the defendant had the opportunity to see the plaintiff's work. Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 415 F.2d
1007 (2d. Cir. 1969).
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courts have determined that minor variations in details of the
game pieces can result in no actionable appropriation of the
copyrighted work.4
Thus far, courts ignore similarities between the games'
underlying computer programs. By ignoring these similarities,
courts are not adequately recognizing and protecting the signifi-
cant expenditures of intellectual and economic effort required in
the development of video games. The effort of authorship can be
sufficiently protected only by linking protection to the full
extent of the author's intellectual effort. Focusing on the final
product solely in the form of the audiovisual display fails to rec-
ognize the unique intellectual effort required to arrive at this
In the video game cases, given the wide distribution of the original works, access has
generally been inferred. Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981);
Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Bay Coin Distribs., Inc., No. 82-1153 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1981)
(available prior to publication of this article on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
This substantial similarity test is cumulative, and infringement occurs at some point
less than wholesale appropriation. This test is the sine qua non of an infringement
action. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:14 at 291 (1981). The courts recognize that
this test is one that they must apply on an ad hoc basis. "The test for infringement of a
copyright is of necessity vague. In the case of verbal 'works' it is well settled that
although the proprietor's monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduction of the words,
there can be no copyright in the 'idea' disclosed but only in their 'expression.' Obviously,
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and
has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
Several courts have bifurcated the substantial similarity test, with the first test
being to dissect the work using expert testimony to show actual copying, and the latter
test being a "common observer" test, which does not allow dissection. However, the lat-
ter test is still employed to distinguish those works that are merely influential. Arnstein
v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
4. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. In general, such holdings limiting
protection are consistent with the treatment given traditional gameboards. See 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.18[H][3][a] (1982). The concept of a game such as bridge may
not be copyrighted; once the game is disseminated, the idea, absent a patent, becomes
part of the public domain. Only the expression of the game in forms such as graphics on
the playing cards or the written rules may be copyrighted. Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton
Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1945); Meccano, Ltd. v. Wagner, 234 F. 912 (S.D. Ohio 1916) modified, 246 F.
603 (1917).
Moreover, courts have at various times determined that most, if not all, expressions
of certain games are insufficiently distinguishable from a game concept to be protected
by copyright law. See Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d
1183 (2d Cir. 1975); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); see
also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (the
copying of a jeweled bee pin was allowed, as the limited expression of a jeweled bee pin
was inseparable from the idea).
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final display. It ignores the central and significant contributions
added by using a computer program to generate a game's graph-
ics and activities. Only by extending copyright protection to the
underlying computer program contained in the game's circuitry
can the efforts of authorship be fully protected.
This Comment will analyze both the manner and scope of
copyright protection currently afforded computer video games.
It will then discuss the means available under federal copyright
laws to protect the underlying computer program and conclude
that the game should be regarded as a unit. The effect of treat-
ing the game as a unit of audiovisual and computer ele-
ments-as opposed to considering only the audiovisual dis-
play-will be to raise certain appropriations to the level of
copyright infringement.
The United States Constitution authorizes long-term pri-
vate copyright monopolies.6 This authorization is predicated
upon dual principles: that economic incentives are a valuable
means of personal motivation, and that such incentives must
necessarily be limited for the benefit of the public at large." The
major public concern is for the free dissemination and develop-
ment of information within our society.7 On a certain level, the
public is afforded maximum access to information when an artist
or author can preserve his interest in a work and still present it
publicly without fearing piracy.8 Otherwise, an author might be
tempted to sell his work to wealthy private collectors rather
than have it printed for mass distribution.
5. The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .. " U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). Works created on or after Jan. 1, 1978 endure for a
term consisting of the author's life plus fifty years thereafter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
6. "Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts. . . . [T]he ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativ-
ity for the general public good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975). Central to this concern, therefore, is the grant of limited protection to an
author without impinging upon future creative works and advances. Another concept
alluded to in Aiken is the natural right to be rewarded for one's work. N. BOORSTYN,
supra note 3, § 1:2. Recognizing the intellectual fruits of one's labor is consistent with
the constitutional regard for private property rights in general. See generally 1 M. Nim-
mxR, supra note 3, § 1.03.
7. See supra note 6.
8. Federal copyright law provides several means to discourage piracy of copyrighted
works. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text, discussing the protections afforded
copyrighted works.
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Progress in the arts, however, is a process of accretion
through influence by prior works. Providing too much protection
for very simple game themes and graphics might forestall the
development of more complex works." Thus, in the normal
course of most infringement claims involving simple works, it
makes sense to deny protection and thereby increase the basic
information available within the public domain.
Although denying protection for simple graphics in tradi-
tional gameboards may serve the public interest by fostering
continued development, limiting protection for computer-gener-
ated games may serve the opposite result. The adaptation of
computer programming and computer technology to traditional
game concepts has significantly altered the intellectual efforts
required for game authorship. 10 Moreover, computer-generated
games require significant capital investments. Thus, an author
venturing into the video game marketplace may copy, in large
part, a popular game rather than expend the efforts and monies
required to develop and promote a new work. The balance
between economic incentive and freedom of information may
become too heavily weighted in the latter's favor. The incentive
may be to copy rather than to create.
Computer video games, however, are amenable to protection
under federal copyright law by means other than simply copy-
righting the images displayed upon the screen. For a work to be
9. See supra note 4.
10. The originator of a video game first states his concept in a textual format called
a source program. Using an assembler or compiler program, he then translates the source
program into a machine readable language known as the object code. Chemically encod-
ing this object code onto silicon microchips produces computer memory devices known as
ROMs (Read Only Memory) or PROMs (Programmable Read Only Memory). Concep-
tually, this circuitry is like a multitude of switches left permanently open or closed
according to instructions. The ROM carries the information that directs the play of the
game and generates the game's graphics. The original concept is, then, realized through
the use of a cathode ray tube (CRT) and other circuitry, including the controls by which
the player plays the game.
Programming languages for computers are classified in levels ranging from low level
to high level languages. The lowest level is the machine language, or the object code.
Computers operate in the most basic unit, binary numbers; e.g., the notation 0101 is
equivalent to the number five. The next higher language is the assembler language. For
example, the instruction LDA 3; ADD 2, tells the computer to load into register A the
number 3, then add to it the number 2, for a total of 5 in register A. The next level of
language, the one generally used by programmers, is the source program. A source pro-
gram is a computer program written in algebraic or symbolic notation designed for ease
of expression and readability. For example, the phrase A = 2 + 3 is a source statement.
For a fuller understanding of computer basics, see any book now readily available on
personal computing. See, e.g., D. McGLYNN, PERSONAL COMPUTING (1979).
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copyrightable, the Constitution simply requires an "author" and
a "writing."" Congress codified the requirements for authorship
and writing in section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act ("1976
Act"). 2 Section 102 protects "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."' Although section 102 does not expressly include
video games or computer programs in its list of mediums of
authorship, 4 the list is not exclusive.' 5
The requirements for authorship and originality are easily
satisfied in a video game work. The courts define "author" to
mean "originator, he to whom anything owes its origin. ' ' 6 "Orig-
inality," in the copyright sense, means "little more than a prohi-
bition of actual copying. ""i Imagination is not a requirement for
authorship, as the common understanding might indicate; mere
diligence in the compilation of mundane facts satisfies this
requirement."
11. See supra note 5.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
13. Id.
14. "Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings."
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
15. Rather, the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but
with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope
of particular categories. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5666.
16. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1972) (quoting Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)).
17. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
(quoting Hoage-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y.
1929)).
18. A compilation is "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1976). In fact, "a modicum of creativity may suffice." Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975). The originality
requirement also does not require judges to sit as critics of the public taste. This princi-
ple was well stated by Justice Holmes: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations .... At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appre-
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The courts have no difficulty in concluding that the audiovi-
sual display, which is fixed in a tangible medium by the game's
Read Only Memory ("ROM"),1 9 meets the section 102 require-
ments for copyright protection.20 Although variations in any
given display result from the participation and interaction of the
person playing the game, a sufficient recurrence of related
images exists for viable protection."'
Although the audiovisual display acquires copyright protec-
tion under section 102, the scope of that protection may be
extremely limited under judicially created principles determin-
ing when one work infringes upon the protected area of another
work. The majority of video game cases deal with nearly identi-
cal copying.22 Several decisions, however, address the limited
scope of protection afforded a valid copyright in the audiovisual
display.23 In one such case, Atari, Inc. v. North American Phil-
lips Consumer Electronics Corp. ,24 the court articulated the lim-
ited scope afforded video game audiovisual displays. The Atari
court ruled that the use of a figure in pursuit, a corral, and a
maze pattern in the "Pac Man" game were not protected
because they are unprotectable ideas2 5 and readily available
ciation. . .. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251-52 (1903).
19. See supra note 10.
20. See cases cited supra note 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See cases cited infra notes 24, 28, 30 and accompanying text.
24. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
25. Id. at 616-17. An axiom of copyright law states that a process or concept may
not be copyrighted; only the expression of an idea or concept qualifies for protection.
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object
of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be
secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all,
by letters-patent.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880). See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1971); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). The separation of idea and expression
is now codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976): "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
When an expression comes close to being nearly indistinguishable from an idea, pro-
tection dissolves. Consequently, at some point when the copyrighted language can be
expressed in only a limited number of ways, no actionable copying occurs. See, e.g., Dur-
ham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Triangle Publications, Inc.
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game themes"' that are part of the public domain. Only the
game characters-the "gobbler," a round yellow figure with a
"V"-shaped mouth, and the pursuing "ghosts" which have
animated eyes and change color-were deemed fanciful enough
to warrant copyright protection. This case indicates, in effect,
that a potential duplicator of a Pac Man-like game need only
alter a few essential game pieces to avert copyright protection.
A Maryland district court employed substantially the same
analysis in Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,28 which con-
cerned infringement of the game "Asteroids." Both games in
Amusement World consisted of spacecraft in a field of rock-like
figures and enemy spacecraft which must be shot down or
avoided. In Amusement World, the court ruled that the plot of
maneuvering spacecraft in an asteroid field was a scene a faire9
and therefore not protected.30 Furthermore, the court deemed
v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The point at which this occurs was
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in what has come to be known as the "abstraction
test."
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. . . . [T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
"ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
In other words, "the scope of copyright protection increases with the extent expres-
sion differs from the idea." Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. Atari, 672 F.2d 617. See also supra notes 4 and 25. The essence of infringement
lies not in taking a theme used by another but rather in the appropriation of particular
expressions through a similarity of treatments, details, plot twists, scenes, and character-
izations. Thus, "no one infringes unless he descends so far into what is concrete to
invade that expression." National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951).
27. Atari, 672 F.2d at 618.
28. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
29. Where the similarity between two works consists solely of thematic concerns
which at the very least do not demonstrate a wholesale lifting of a story's total concept
or feel, no actionable appropriation exists. In other words, when scenes or simple plot
devices necessarily result from the same situation, or from a thematic concept such as a
lost child being reunited with his parents, only scenes a faire are generated, and they are
not protected by copyright law. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Reyher
v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Alexander
v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
30. 547 F. Supp. at 229.
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the images of spacecraft to be insufficient expressive elements
for copyright protection because they were not separable from
the mere idea of spacecraft.31 "Defendants used plaintiff's idea
and those portions of plaintiff's expression that were inextrica-
bly linked to that idea. . .. The remainder of defendants'
expression is different from plaintiff's expression."' ,
Another case, Atari, Inc. v. Ken Williams,3 also involved
the "Pac Man" game. The disputed work, "Jawbreakers," con-
sisted of a game visually similar to the "Pac Man" game. The
appearance of the central figure in Jawbreakers differed from
the "Pac Man" characters by having serrated teeth, and the pur-
suing figures had different colors and faces. The court found no
actionable copying because the similarities were based upon
common game themes, including the rules, strategy, and pro-
gress of the game's play-all unprotectable ideas."
Federal copyright law authorizes means of protecting the
game other than relying solely upon the resultant display. Copy-
right law can be used to protect the game's computer program
when expressed in textual format, 3 i.e., a source program." The
source program is the first level of program development and is
both written and readable by humans. The requirements for
copyright protection-original authorship and a writing fixed in
a tangible medium-are easily met by a computer program in
the source stage.37 With video games, and many other computer
31. Id. at 230.
32. Id.
33. No. 81-410 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1981) (available prior to publication of this article
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
34. Id.
35. Textual works, such as the source program, fall within the 1976 Copyright Act's
definition of literary works: "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, discs,
or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
Audiovisual works are defined as works that "consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices as projec-
tors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
36. See supra note 10. Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection accrues when a
work is "fixed," that is, embodied "in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 102 (1976).
37. Congress perceived no need to specify, in the general provisions of the 1976 Act,
the Act's coverage of computer software: "the new expressive forms-electronic music,
filmstrips, and computer programs, for example-could be regarded as an extension of
copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus
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uses, however, the source program is compiled or transformed
into a language, the object code, which can only be read by a
machine. This code is then chemically encoded onto microchips,
creating ROMs or PROMs (Programmable Read Only
Memories)."8
Although the Third Circuit recently held that computer
formats fixed in a ROM are protectable by copyright,3 9 the deci-
sions by other courts indicate potential conflict.40 The uncer-
tainty as to the validity of copyright protection arises from two
circumstances: by the author fixing the program in the electronic
circuitry of the ROM and by the author expressing the program
in a language readable only by machines. " Whether a copyright
holder creates a loophole in program protection when he embod-
ies the program within the ROM is a matter of present
controversy.4
To deny copyright protection for the object code because of
its immediate expression in a format unreadable by humans is
no longer appropriate. One line of cases supporting denial begins
with the 1908 decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo. 43 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a piano roll
copied by the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff's copyright
considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation." H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5664.
38. See supra note 10.
39. See Apple Computers, Inc. v. Franklin Computers Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd and rem., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d. Cir. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction, and held that information in object
codes and contained in a ROM are subject to copyright protection. The defendant had
admitted copying the plaintiff's program.
40. See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
1979), Aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (see infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (the court in a similar context stated that computer
input formats were not copyrighted).
41. See Apple, 714 F.2d 1240.
42. Numerous authors have addressed this issue. See, e.g., L. GASAwAY & M. MUR-
PHY, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1980); FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 20-21 (1979) [herein-
after cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT]; Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
in Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDINE L. Rv.
547 (1982); Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's: Practical Guidelines for
Evolving Needs, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 205 (1981); Stern, Another Look at
Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for Object Code?, 3
COMPUTER/LAw J. 1 (1981).
43. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Data Cash
Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I11. 1979), aff'd on other grounds,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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in the sheet music. The Court determined that this perforated
piano roll was not a copy in terms of federal copyright law, but
merely a component part of a machine." Moreover, the piano
roll could not be considered a direct form of communication
between humans because, unlike sheet music, it was not visually
readable.45 In a 1973 decision, Goldstein v. California,4 the
Court reasoned that, prior to amendment in 1972, the Copyright
Act did not prohibit record piracy because sound recordings
were considered component parts of a machine.47 Together,
these cases imply that although an author can copyright the
source program, copyrighting would not prevent duplication of
the program when an author places it on a computer memory
device. There would be no infringement of the copyrighted
source program because no human communication would have
taken place at the object code level.
An Illinois district court applied this rationale in a recent
decision, Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,8 which
concerned a nonvideo computer game, "Compu-Chess." In Data
Cash, the defendant produced a unit nearly identical to the
plaintiff's unit by unloading the information contained in the
plaintiff's ROM directly into the computer elements of the
duplicated game. The Data Cash court ruled that under the
1976 Act,49 computer programs were to be treated the same as
they were under the earlier copyright laws.50 This result was
predicated upon section 117 as it was originally formulated
under the 1976 Act. Section 117 stated:
Scope of Exclusive Rights: Use in Conjunction with Com-
puters and Similar Information Systems. . . . [T]his title does
not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or
lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction
with automatic systems ... than those afforded to works
under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes
of the State, in effect on December 31, 1977 .... 51
44. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.
45. Id. at 17.
46. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
47. Id. at 566. Federal law did not, however, preempt California from authorizing
additional protection.
48. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), af'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1980).
49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1067.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Applying the reasoning of the White-Smith Music line of
cases, 52 the Data Cash court determined that the placement of
the computer program in object code created a loophole in pro-
tection, leaving the program open to unauthorized duplication.
The holding in Data Cash is inapplicable to current uses of
computer programs. The 1976 Act relied upon in Data Cash was
amended in 1980.5' To fully understand these 1980 changes, a
brief history of the 1976 Act is in order.
The desire to account for recent and far ranging technologi-
cal advances was a major impetus for the extensive revisions of
federal copyright laws. 54 The issue of whether computer pro-
grams are a fitting subject of copyright protection elicited con-
siderable debate. At the time of enactment of the 1976 Act, Con-
gress deferred the decision concerning computer programs.
Congress appointed a special commission, the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyright Works ("CONTU"), to
gather information and make recommendations to Congress.5
Meanwhile, Congress left the copyright status of computer pro-
grams unchanged.5 6 Subsequently, the majority of the CONTU
commissioners recommended a broad range of protection for
computer programs, regardless of whether the program was
expressed in machine readable language. 7
Pursuant to recommendations made by CONTU, Congress
amended the 1976 Act, effective December 1980, to read: "Sec-
tion 101 of Title 17 of the United States Code is amended to
have at the end thereof the following new language: A 'computer
program' is a set of instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer to bring about a certain result. 58 More impor-
tantly, Congress rewrote section 117, creating a nontransferable
right to translate a program into another computer language or
otherwise adapt it without liability.5 9 Furthermore, this section
no longer limits computer program protection to that existing
under prior case law. 0 Section 117 now states:
52. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
54. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 3.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 9-26.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival pur-
poses only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the
event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise trans-
ferred, along with the copy from which such copies were pre-
pared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all
rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner. 1
The presence of this limitation on exclusive use indicates, by
negative implication, that protection for a computer program is
valid even when translated into object code. If a source program
can be "adapted" into object code as an essential step in the
utilization of the original program without triggering infringe-
ment, then this provision would be unnecessary and meaning-
less. These 1980 amendments are consistent with the express
congressional intent 62 to eliminate the untenable distinctions
created by the White-Smith line of decisions.
Since the 1980 amendments, one federal court has specifi-
cally held that the imprinting of a computer program onto a
silicon chip satisfies the fixation requirement for a computer
program without opening a loophole for unauthorized duplica-
tion.63 Moreover, the court found the Data-Cash decision inap-
plicable.6 4 Any remaining question of indirect communication
invalidating copyright protection should be dispelled with the
passage of the amendments.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
62. "[Section 102] is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinc-
tions, derived from cases such as White-Smith ... under which statutory
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or medium in
which the work is fixed." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5665.
63. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
64. Id. at 175.
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Although the information contained in the ROM is correctly
viewed as a fitting subject matter for copyright protection, an
additional problem exists. Several authors have raised the issue
whether the object code is unprotected as an integral part of an
electronic machine. 6 One author conceptually likened the ROM
to a cam,6" an integral part of a machine which serves to direct
work as well as to perform work. Under this conception, the
information contained in the memory device merely controls the
processing of information retrieval and development, and in the
normal course of operation the computer program fixed in the
ROM does not communicate information, but simply performs a
task.
The prohibition against copyrighting utilitarian devices
should not, however, forestall protection of the information con-
tained in the game's memory devices. The conceptualization of
the object code as part of a utilitarian device is unnecessarily
limited. It is true that an author cannot copyright a per se utili-
tarian device. 7 For example, although a copyright may protect a
blueprint as a graphic work,68 it does not protect the strictly
utilitarian product designed from the blueprint,"' such as a
house or a machine. In other words, anyone can copy the useful
object, absent a patent,1 0 without infringement occurring. How-
ever, in a leading case on utilitarian devices, Mazer v. Stein7 1
the Supreme Court refused to deny protection so long as the
expressive form of a manufactured work can rationally be distin-
guished. In Mazer, the Court held that a sculptural base on a
lamp was protectable despite its use in a common commercial
product.72 The key appears to be whether the expressive ele-
ments of the utilitarian device can be perceived or expressed
separately from the functional elements.7
65. See supra note 42.
66. L. GASAWAY & M. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 29 for cases disallowing protection
for useful objects.
67. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Moreover, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)
defines a useful article as: an "article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information."
68. See 1 M. NIMMzR, supra note 3, § 2.08[D].
69. Once a structure is built from the plans, it would become an intrinsic utilitarian
structure. See Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967).
70. See infra note 84.
71. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
72. Id. at 218.
73. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1976). In
Esquire, the court refused protection for a lighting fixture; although having an esthetic
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Thus, the fixing of a copyrighted musical score into mechan-
ical vinyl grooves on a record surface does not withdraw the
work from protection because the music is still capable of being
transferred or communicated with the aid of a machine.7 ' The
same reasoning should apply to copyrighted computer informa-
tion. As the plaintiff in Data Cash7 5 learned to his dismay, the
information contained in a ROM is susceptible to being copied
directly onto other memory devices.76 Additionally, the informa-
tion contained in the ROM is capable of being retranslated into
a textual format (the source program) through the process of
reverse compilation."
Conceptually, the message contained within the electronic
circuitry known as a ROM can be perceived or transferred dis-
tinctly and separately from its utility as an electronic machine
part. The 1976 Act, as amended, would seem to favor such a
conceptual dichotomy.1 8 Under the amended Act, it should make
no qualitative difference whether an audio or video recording is
fixed in an analog medium such as grooves imprinted onto a
vinyl record surface, or in a slightly more indirect manner such
as digital representations of sights and sounds.
In one video game case, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic
International, Inc.,7 the court held that copyright law protects
the computer program embodied in the ROM." The court
employed a comparison between readouts of the two programs
to look for evidence of manifest similarity. The court found rele-
vant indicia of similarity when it considered that over 85 percent
of the information contained in the memory devices was identi-
cal, an error in the original game was repeated in the defen-
dant's program, and a buried copyright notice appeared only
when the contents of the memory devices were read.8'
Technological advances have dramatically reduced the size
quality attributable to its modern design, this element was held inseparable from its
function.
74. See supra notes 14 & 35.
75. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), a/I'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 1066.
77. Just as a program is used to compile the source program into object code (see
supra note 10), another program can be used to reverse this process.
78. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.04[C].
79. No. 81-1852 (D.N.J. June 24, 1981), afrd and rem., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
80. 685 F.2d at 871-77.
81. Id.
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and price of recent generations of computers, while significantly
increasing computational powers. As computers have become
less cumbersome and less expensive, the trend in development of
computer memory devices has become increasingly sophisticated
and labor intensive.82 A concomitant ease of inexpensive copying
of information contained in computer memory devices has
accompanied this trend. Computer programs, in whatever for-
mat, regardless of being directly readable and understandable by
humans, require intellectual and economic commitments. Com-
puter video games offer one popular spinoff of the recent
advances in computer memory devices. A movement toward pro-
tecting the information contained in the ROM is a healthy and
important advance in copyright law.8"
Video game authors expect the popularity of their creations
to be short-lived, and understandably seek to protect their intel-
lectual and monetary interests. They are entitled to securely dis-
seminate and promote their product before the public without
fearing substantial losses through piracy. Federal copyright law
provides a useful and valuable tool for protecting the intellectual
labor represented by an author's expression. Copyright law may
very well be the best means of protection available to a creator
of a video game.8" Once an author meets the basic requirements
of copyright law, the law entitles the author to the full panoply
82. "[T]he critical factor in advancing computer technology over the next decade
will be the development of software. Techniques for improving the production and effi-
ciency of computer hardware are well advanced and trends in miniaturization can be
expected to continue for several years. The result will be a continued reduction in hard-
ware costs. At the same time, however, costs associated with computer software are
expected to rise dramatically because they rely on human rather than machine capabili-
ties." STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUR-
VEY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES PRESENT AND FUTURE 70 (1981).
83. See generally CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42.
84. Several other means of protecting intellectual properties, such as patent, trade-
mark, unfair trade practices, and common law misappropriation, are potentially open to
authors of video games. Patent and trademark are fields unto themselves, and though
important, demand more detail and space than can be given in this Comment. For a
comparison of patent and copyright protection of computer software in general, see
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 16-18. See also Rose, Protection of Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9
PEPPERDiNE L. REV. 547 (1982); Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's: Practi-
cal Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RUTGERS CoMPu'rm & TECH. L.J. 205 (1981). A
common law misappropriation action is of questionable validity. Preemption is now a
possibility under § 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). Cf. Hoeling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980) (historical facts and ideas are excluded from federal copyright protection and
therefore the states are preempted from granting such ideas or facts legal protection).
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of statutory rights. The copyright holder can register his work
for minimal costs. 8 The law entitles the holder to a long term
property right 6 in the work and the exclusive right to
reproduce8 7 the work or create derivative works.88 In the case of
infringement, the holder can seek actual or statutory damages,8 9
attorneys fees,90 and in certain cases, seizure and destruction of
offending materials." Although the computer era presents new
challenges to the courts, the holder of a video game copyright
should not be denied this valuable protection.
The copyright laws as currently promulgated are capable of
protecting both a computer program and an audiovisual display
when fixed in the quasi-mechanical medium of a ROM. Fixing a
program in a ROM should not create a loophole in protection.
The simplicity of plot and images within some audiovisual dis-
plays should not by themselves withdraw a video game from the
ambit of federal copyright protection. The game should be
examined as a unit. Although the display may be of a simple
nature, this does not indicate a simple underlying computer pro-
gram. Courts should consider whether the computer program
has been duplicated as a factor in determining copyright
infringement.
Jeffrey B. Mahan
85. 17 U.S.C. § 708 (1976).
86. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-05 (1976).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 509 (1976).
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